

# **Death of the Westphalia State System, Implications for Future Military Employment.**

**A Monograph  
by  
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# **ABSTRACT**

DEATH OF THE WESTPHALIA STATE SYSTEM, IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE MILITARY EMPLOYMENT by MAJ Jeff McCoy, US. Army, 46 pages.

This monograph will address two juxtaposed themes: first, the primacy of state sovereignty, the founding assumption of contemporary international relations, embodied by the principles of Westphalia; and second the assertion arising out of globalization that a conventionally focused military designed to protect those principles seems to be increasingly anachronistic in a globalized, interdependent world. The thesis of this paper is that globalization and non-state actor influence will continue, but so will the sovereignty of nation states, with nationalism and various other ideologies remaining an over-riding value and belief system for the foreseeable future on the world stage requiring the US military to always be ready to conduct decisive, conventional warfare.

The nation-state as defined by Dr. Kalev Holsti is a combination of traditions, territories, and a recognized government that retains the loyalty of its people is fundamental to understanding the intrinsic power of the state, independent of any potential ability to coerce either internally or externally. A military that can ensure its survival is a key component to ensure a state retains the loyalty of its citizens. This foundation for understanding what the state is, lends to the past and future implications of the Peace of Westphalia and its effect on the sovereignty of states.

The term Westphalia and its meaning and framework are often not well defined, or similar to Clausewitz in military discussions it is often quoted, but seldom specifically defined. Many very respected and popular international relations theorists have in recent years speculated on the death of the Westphalia construct given globalization and the apparent rise in power of the non-state actor. These theorists like Thomas Barnett, Thomas Friedman, and Samuel Huntington provide various lenses through which to explore the validity of the Westphalia model and its constructive use in the future. Inseparable in this argument are the effects of a COIN centric force that is currently decisively engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan and its ability to react to future conventional threats.

Lastly, achieving an understanding of what Westphalia is lends to the appropriate training, manning and equipping of a nation-states military, as Westphalia essentially ended the rein of state-sponsored mercenary armies in 1648. The argument being that if Westphalia is alive and well, and that the forces of globalization and non-state actors have not eroded the boundaries of modern states, then a conventional capable military force will be necessary and desired for the foreseeable future.

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## INTRODUCTION

*"Only the dead have seen the end of war."*<sup>1</sup>  
Plato.

Most watershed events in history are well known and apparent to many with little explanation. American grade school children commit to memory dates like; 1492; July 4<sup>th</sup> 1776; and December 7<sup>th</sup>, 1941 for their obvious associations to dramatic events. Other dates are not so well remembered but the events that transpired can have dramatic, if not well understood, effects on the individuals, organizations, and even the superpower involved. 1648 is a little known, and even less understood date that continues to have a profound impact in the world today as it marks the signing of the Peace of Westphalia. The Peace of Westphalia, comprised of the two treaties of Osnabrück and Münster, brought to an end the Thirty Years War an especially vicious period of warfare in world history which had resulted in over two million battle deaths and was noted for its wanton brutality against civil populations.<sup>2</sup> In the period leading up to the signing of the treaties, mercenary armies were hired out by dynastic elements (not confined to only kings or city states but included also then international actors like the Catholic Church) to conduct it's wars and other martial policy to achieve their desired objectives. Often the objectives centered on enforcing or protecting the religion of a particular country or a territorial claim long in dispute. This led to armies of relatively diverse composition and

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<sup>1</sup> Michael Krause, Brig., *Square Pegs for Round Holes: Current Approaches to Future Warfare and the Need to Adapt*, (Australia, Land Warfare Studies Centre, JUN 2007), 1.

<sup>2</sup> G. Ikenberry, *After Victory* (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2001), 275; Kalevi Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War*, (Great Britain, Cambridge University Press) 3.

even more dubious loyalty that were often not regularly paid or fed when fielded against an opposing force. This would often spell calamity for any neighboring towns or villages that the soldiers would often pillage for food and other spoils in order to survive and made being a mercenary profitable. War in this period often spilled across national borders and across ethnic compositions of a population given the religious nature of much of the conflict, bringing widespread death, disease, and pestilence. The Peace of Westphalia ended the carnage and set the framework for modern state sovereignty and is often argued as the foundation for how nation-state actors dialogue and form policy, until some experts say, globalization and the rise of the ability of non-state actors to influence policy and achieve results without the framework of a state.

### **Somalia and System Shock**

The date of 3 October 1993 will not be remembered as well as the actual events and images that took place on that hot, awful day in Mogadishu, Somalia, in which a small contingent of American Army Rangers and Delta Force Operatives undertook an operation to detain two of clan lord Farrah Aidid's lieutenants.<sup>3</sup> The battle that ensued from that action would leave nineteen American soldiers dead, four advanced MH-60 Blackhawk helicopters destroyed, and one pilot captured by Somali clan lords.<sup>4</sup> America would be horrified by the images of American dead being abused on the streets of Mogadishu, and would ultimately honor two of the fallen, MSG Gary Gordan and SFC

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<sup>3</sup> Mark Bowden, *Black Hawk Down*, (New York, Penguin Books 2000), 1.

<sup>4</sup> Bowden, *Black Hawk Down*, 331-333.



Randy Shughart with its highest award for valor, the Medal of Honor. Although the battle would leave an estimated 2,000 Somalis dead or wounded, 3 October would become a holiday for the rulers and clans of Somalia in which they withstood the onslaught of the world's only superpower, forcing the US to withdrawal from the country just months later.<sup>5</sup> Ordinary citizens in America and soldiers would wonder why the US was there, how could America's finest military personnel be caught so short against an abysmally trained and equipped guerilla force or so seemingly squandered by an American administration. It marked a dangerous precedent on the world stage that showed the limits of American resolve when its finest men and women would be sacrificed in actions that have unclear ties to American national security. It represented a shock to the system of a superbly trained, manned, and equipped force that seemed without peer in the early 1990's; and only through success in Balkan peace keeping and political amnesia by the Clinton administration would the events of 3 October be ignored and not soon remembered.

### **September 11<sup>th</sup>**

September 11, 2001 is different from above as it will unfortunately be *well remembered* for years to come by both Americans and others around the world for the tremendous loss of life resulting from the terrorist attacks on New York City and the Pentagon. Published theorists like Thomas Barnett and John B. Alexander from the fields of international relations and national security herald September 11 as a symptom

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<sup>5</sup> Bowden, *Black Hawk Down*, 333.

of a world that was becoming more connected or “globalized” in which greater economic and social stability is achieved.<sup>6</sup> Still more theorists like Thomas Friedman claim the cost of this new connectedness is the loss of security from non-state actors that had gained the ability to kill thousands with access to modern weapons and technologies that gave them the ability to inflict untold destruction on unprotected population centers around the globe.<sup>7</sup> Globalization brings increased political power to many non-state actors, including international organizations, large corporations and of course the ubiquitous terrorist. Many future world theorists who have become popular in the mainstream media like Barnett, Alexander and to a lesser extent Samuel Huntington predict and describe paradigm shift for the US military and how it will be employed in the foreseeable future.<sup>8</sup> This belief is seemingly justified by the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, where US forces currently conduct counter-insurgency operations and not the high-intensity operations that they have excelled at in previous conflicts. As brought out in the introduction, there are two interrelated themes that will be addressed in this paper. This monograph will address two juxtaposed themes: first, the primacy of state sovereignty, the founding assumption of contemporary international relations, embodied by the principles of Westphalia; and second, the assertion arising out by globalization that

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<sup>6</sup> Thomas Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map*, (New York, Penguin Group 2004), 1-3; John B. Alexander, *The Changing Nature of Warfare, the Factors Mediating Future Conflict, and Implications for SOF*, (Florida, Joint Special Operations University, April 2006), 1.

<sup>7</sup> Thomas L. Friedman, *The World is Flat*, Rel 3.0, (New York, Picador, 2005), 59.

<sup>8</sup> Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map*, 1-3; Alexander, *The Changing Nature of Warfare, the Factors Mediating Future Conflict, and Implications for SOF*, 1; Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1996) 28-29.

a conventionally focused military designed to protect those principles seems to be increasingly anachronistic in a globalized, interdependent world.

## **A System in Struggle for Identity**

The importance in discussing these “dates” at the introduction of this work is that they serve as useful representations of the central element of struggle in today’s Army doctrine and culture as it enters its fifth year of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army since the end of World War II had focused nearly exclusively on conducting decisive ground combat operations, with Vietnam and its aftermath seen as the consequence, admittedly simplistically, for not letting a conventional army fight a conventional war. Operations Provide Relief, Restore Hope and USFORSOM the collective names of operations in Somalia by both the US and the UN came shortly after Operation Just Cause (Panama) and Desert Storm (Iraq) had seemingly validated the AirLand Battle Doctrine of the US against any potential foe. However, Somalia represented the first attempt at Peace Enforcement by the US in the evolving conventional role of the US military after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989.<sup>9</sup> The events of 3 October 1993 would question the ability of even the best conventional military to be half-heartedly committed to a peace-keeping or peace enforcement mission. America, with the ability of modern media to immediately transmit images into living rooms, is more capricious than most about seeing even the lightest of casualties in operations that are not readily identified with national survival or are tied to conflicts that

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<sup>9</sup> Kenneth Allard, COL, Phd., *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*, (Washington, National Defense University Press Publications, 1995) 13-15.

seem unwinnable. The speed of information, the potential administration change every four years in Washington, and the small (but not cheap) all volunteer force that is the best the world has seen makes the employment and readiness of the US military a key consideration in ensuring the protection of the United States and its sovereignty. Non-state actors make this an even more complicated issue as it clouds the responsibility of how and with what a nation state should use to respond to nontraditional security threats. Together these issues comprise the tension that is felt today in the military with globalization, the threat of non-state actors, and their ultimate implication for the survival of the Westphalia system.

Globalization and the rise of powerful non-state actors could seemingly have brought the death blow to both the Westphalia nation-state system and conventional warfare for decades to come, raising serious concerns for national security policy of the US and the composition, training and ability of the future US military. This struggle or crisis of identity for the Army has only become worse as combat in Iraq and Afghanistan concurrently have stretched into its fifth year. If an army can be considered the identity of a nation, a summation of its values and the total experience of the soldiers and leaders that make up its ranks; then those same soldiers that participated in the opening phase of Operation Iraq Freedom (OIF) reaped the benefits of the years of training and cost of creating a force par excellence in conventional operations. Company-grade officers, that were the company and troop commanders during the high-intensity phase that would shortly either continue with winning the peace or move on to professional education, and would not question the mistakes that led to the insurgency, but would question why the American people and its administration would squander the conventional ability and

experience of its military. It is also these leaders and soldiers that understand that it is nearly impossible to have a unit trained for conventional operations and expect them not to encounter difficulties in transitioning to stability operations without the ability to stand-down and retrain/equip for that mission. It is a completely different mind and skill set that is not quickly transitioned to or from, within US combat units. Ultimately this paper is not setting out to refute the lessons of counter-insurgency warfare, but rather to exalt in the conventional capability of its military; and that for every continued rotation in Iraq gives a chance for parity with peer competitors.

## **Purpose**

The purpose of this monograph is to discuss the validity of the argument that the continued connectedness of the global community and the rise of the non-state actor together equal the death of the Westphalia State-System that has been the norm since established in 1648. As an army is entrusted with the protection and survival of a nation; the Westphalia model shows why it is American soldiers and not Blackwater security that patrols the streets of Baghdad with new Iraq Police and Army Units. This is central to the argument and its implications for the future of the US military in its potential employment, development, and training; as a force currently configured for large scale conventional confrontations that differs dramatically from a force designed to maintain security and conduct nation-building operations. The 2001 Field Manual 1-0 *The Army* says it succinctly in its opening chapter; “We must prepare for decisive action in all operations. But above all, we are ready to fight and win the Nation’s wars—our

nonnegotiable contract with the American people.”<sup>10</sup> In the next publication of that same manual, the same phraseology can be found on the same opening page; however in the later edition the wording is unmistakably “watered-down;” “It prepares for and delivers decisive action in all operations. Above all, the Army provides combatant commanders with versatile land forces ready to fight and win the Nation’s wars.”<sup>11</sup> This more than anything else captures the fears of many inside and out of the military. Has the current military shifted too far from its ability to conduct decisive conventional operations with five years of counter-insurgency warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan? Is the non-state actor the foot soldier of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, or will America endure another Task Force Smith, defeated by a yet unseen, capable conventional force costing the lives of Americas finest?

## **Thesis and Organization**

The thesis of this paper is that globalization and non-state actor influence will continue, but so will the sovereignty of nation states, with nationalism and various other ideologies remaining an over-riding value and belief system for the foreseeable future on the world stage requiring the US military to always be ready to conduct decisive, conventional warfare.

This paper is divided into four separate sections that articulate the power of the Westphalia Model and its effects on the employment of a conventional military force. First, nation-states and the Westphalia Model will be defined to articulate the key actors

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<sup>10</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 1-0, *The Army* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 14 June 2001), 1-1.

<sup>11</sup> Field Manual 1-0, *The Army*, 1-1.

required to make this argument clear and succinct. Second, alternate world and globalization theorists like Thomas Barnett and Samuel Huntington will be analyzed to discuss the opposing views of the Westphalia System that herald its decline on the world stage. Next, the current operating environment that the US military is employed in will be analyzed and evaluated using both historical evidence and potential peer competitors to predict if conventional confrontation is indeed unlikely for the decades to come. Last, and most importantly, given the competing visions of Westphalia, and the current and future operating environments that the US military is likely to be engaged in the importance and legitimacy of the Westphalia nation-state model will be validated in its use for both policy makers and leaders alike in the formulation of security and military strategy for the United States.

## **NATION-STATES and the WESTPHALIA STATE SYSTEM**

### **The Nation-State Defined**

In any argument, it helps immensely to define the context and parameters of the variables of the topic in question. This of course sounds elementary, but any military professional will point to the benefits of having a clearly understood professional vocabulary to prevent misunderstanding of mission-orders. This unfortunately is not the case in the field of International Relations or Political Science where no Field Manual 1.02 *Operational Terms and Graphics* exists to clarify the meanings of the various terms and ideologies that exist. So, defining the nation-state is an important start-point so all readers can understand the perspective and context of the topic in order to build the basis for building a coherent argument. The author Kalevi J. Holsti in his book *The State, War, and the State of War* gives an enduring definition of what comprises a nation-state. Dr.

Holsti makes the argument that in order to be considered a legitimate state, three conditions must be met: 1) the idea of the state (traditions, history, culture); 2) the physical basis of the state (territory); 3) institutional expression of the state (internal and externally recognized, functioning government).<sup>12</sup> The common meaning of a sovereign state is one of the most broadly defined with much implicit understanding but no commonly agreed to terminology in political science. Something that adds strength to the construct that Dr. Holsti uses is its ability to be used separate from the military power of the state. Power, war and the ability of a nation to maintain its sovereignty invariably creep into the definition of a nation-state; however Holsti's construct relies more on a state's ability to maintain loyalty from its citizens rather than their relative power which is a more useful definition in codifying what a nation-state is versus what it does or has the ability to do. This is an important distinction to make as it supports the notion of the Westphalia principle of equality among states that will be addressed shortly. This model also works well in identifying those factors that often led to the failure of a state independent of their economic or military power; losing the ability of the nation to retain the loyalty of its constituents. Russia in 1917 had alienated a populace with constant warfare, leading to their inability to maintain the third criteria of institutional (government) expression. Somalia in the 1990's also showed this same fault, eventually falling into deeper chaos with no clear government control. Other non-state entities lack at least one of the conditions that allow a successful state to be formed and maintained. The Kurds in Northern Iraq lack both territory, and an institution; Palestine is obviously

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<sup>12</sup> Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War*, 82-84.



lacking the territorial control preventing statehood, however close it maybe to this condition being changed. The ability of the model to separate economic and military horse power from defining a state will be essential in refuting much of the critic of Westphalia Model of international relations. By measuring states by their idea and traditions, territory, and its institutions and removing either the economic or military power of a state, the discussion of the sovereignty of a state can be more objectively discussed.

### **Peace of Westphalia Defined**

In comparison to defining the state, the term Westphalia and its meaning is difficult to define with precision, but also highly controversial in its relevance in today's contemporary operating environment. In terms of defining the "Westphalia System" there is much argument and little common understanding or defining what Westphalia System is or means. It is similar to the often quoted, but seldom read Clausewitz in military theory circles. With a quick glance through many modern international relations or political science books it is easy to find the term Westphalia in the index, usually with an association with state's sovereignty, often thrown into theory with the assumption that everyone must know what it means. This however is not the case; a point in fact that many pundits argue over both what Westphalia has meant to the world of international relations and others that contest that no matter what it has meant its influence over the world body has surely expired.

As noted in the introduction, the Treaty of Westphalia was brought about by the dynastic wars fought over a period of time often referred to as the Thirty Years War. Simplistically, this period of war was essentially a war of religion or the religious

intolerance that essentially put the Holy Roman Empire and Spain (collectively part of the Habsburg dynasty) against the nations of Denmark, France, Sweden, and the then German princes. The Habsburg or universalists fought for the Church of Rome and their right to assert Catholicism where they willed; by contrast, the particularist actors rejected the rule of the Pope, upholding the right of individual sovereignty of the state and their right to decide policies of their own accord.<sup>13</sup> And, as also noted, the treaty ended a particularly cruel period of time in world history that would be the watershed event that would lead nations to the belief of creating and maintaining a national army.<sup>14</sup> The scourge of mercenary armies roaming the continent at will, loosely controlled by their benefactor often pillaging cities to feed the soldiers, livestock and camp-followers that habitually followed the fielded army, bringing fear and pestilence invariably to any village or town they happened across would not be tolerated again by the nation states involved in the war.<sup>15</sup> Two treaties were actually signed that comprise what is today referred to as the Treaty of Westphalia. The peace process began as early as 1646, but not all parties were willing to enter negotiations. Eventually the two sides would sign two treaties in two separate cities roughly fifty kilometers apart. The Treaty of Munster between the Holy Roman Empire and France and the Treaty of Osnabruck between the

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<sup>13</sup> Andreas Osiander, *Sovereignty, international Relations, and the Westphalian Myth*, International Organization, Vol. 55, No. 2 (Spring 2001), 251-252.

<sup>14</sup> Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War*, 2-4.

<sup>15</sup> Geoffrey Parker, *The Thirty Years' War*, (Routledge, Chapman, and Hill, London, 1984), 129-32 and 179- 80.

Empire and Sweden would be concluded 24 October, 1648; the treaty named for the two separate camps, Munster for the Protestants, and Osnabruck for the Catholics.<sup>16</sup>

Some of the confusion over what the Westphalia state system is, begins with the treaties themselves, which again very simplistically in word achieved only a few things including: 1) That individual monarchies were free to choose the religion of their country; 2) Established the principle of equal rights among states in regards to religion (specifically concerning Protestants and Catholics), while giving protection to religious minorities; and 3) Returned land that had generally been conquered during the war; benefiting greatly the countries of France and Sweden and rendering the Holy Roman Empire politically impotent.<sup>17</sup> However, in tradition the treaty has had a profound effect on modern politics and international relations. It set precedence for the nation-state system of international relations that this paper argues is still relevant today; the most important and valued tradition being the establishment of sovereignty for individual nation-states, independent of external actors meddling in the internal affairs of the state.<sup>18</sup> Dr. Leo Gross, an early International Relations theorist who gained his doctorate in Vienna before moving to the United States to teach enumerates many of the precedents established by the Peace of Westphalia in an article he wrote for *The American Journal of International Law* in 1948. Clearly, a state's sovereignty was established in terms of its ability to decide its internal policies, but Dr. Gross also argues that it laid the ground

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<sup>16</sup> Parker, *The Thirty Years' War*, 179-89.

<sup>17</sup> Osiander, *Sovereignty, international Relations, and the Westphalian Myth*, 269.

<sup>18</sup> Osiander, *Sovereignty, international Relations, and the Westphalian Myth*, 261.

work for the idea of the failed League of Nations, and its successor the United Nations at the conclusion of World War II; setting the precedent for international law in the world stage. Highlighting that it obligated all participants to enforce the peace, with arms if necessary, no matter the side of original conflict the combatant was initially on at the time of the signing of the treaties. It also set the provisions for a moratorium of war, and set the stage for the settlement of disputes on the international stage in a peaceful manner.<sup>19</sup> It significantly replaced religion as the primary function of entering into alliances and adopted a more *reason of state* system that would later come to be recognized as the balance of power theory that has also dominated international relations since the treaty was established in 1648.<sup>20</sup> So, when the term Westphalia state system is used it can be summarized from the above theorists that it set a precedent for: 1) setting the internal sovereignty of nation-states, free from external interference of internal affairs (initially religious) that would ultimately lead to the requirement for establishment of a national army and not the mercenary forces seen prior to 1648; 2) the beginning of international law and governance (UN Charter); 3) replacing religion with *reason of state* as the primary reason for states to enter and exit treaties and alliances that ultimately led to balance of power politics that would begin to dominate world politics.

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<sup>19</sup> Leo Gross, *The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948*, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 42, No. 1. (Jan., 1948), 22-25.

<sup>20</sup> Gross, *The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948*, 26-27.

## Initial Westphalia Counter-Point

Counter arguments against Westphalia will be discussed in greater detail later after the positions of Barnett, Huntington and others have been introduced. But, it is important to briefly introduce them at this point to have a lens in which to view them accurately. Two principle arguments against the continued validity of Westphalia first include the belief that globalization has fundamentally changed the global political structure beyond which the context of Westphalia was intended; and second the belief that the principles of Westphalia are a myth and that the notion of a states sovereignty has never lived up to the intended values and principles.

There is a loss of perspective in the fundamental argument of the theorists and scholars that oppose the belief that Westphalia is still a viable model for international relations. These theorists and scholars, again the more notable being Dr. Thomas Barnett or Stephen Alexander, a required reading in the current School of Advanced Military Studies curriculum, often warn against seeing globalization as a fad, and claim it is a sign of a fundamental change to world order in which state sovereignty is becoming ever less relevant.<sup>21</sup> As argued by many of the alternate world theorists to be discussed next, that the apparent growing connectedness constitutes a new rule-set or paradigm shift, and use the tragic example of the terrorist attacks on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 as proof of the power of this new world order.<sup>22</sup> To begin to refute this; it does not seem logical that one

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<sup>21</sup> Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map*, 1-3; Alexander, *The Changing Nature of Warfare, the Factors Mediating Future Conflict, and Implications for SOF*, 1.

<sup>22</sup> Friedman, *The World is Flat*, 59.

necessarily leads to the other. First, globalization and non-state actors are not necessarily connected or reinforcing in their effects. Powerful non-state actors have and can exist in a disconnected, Gap country, independent of any notion of globalization. Next, as touched on earlier in this paper, the forces that make up the effect called globalization are a matter of perspective. Rome and its citizens probably considered themselves globalized, importing and exporting goods throughout their known world to build its own and help other economies grow and prosper.<sup>23</sup>

Today's globalization trend is a matter of velocity and not a new precedence. Thomas Freidman in his book *The World is Flat* articulates this view even further by giving the view that there have been periods of globalization beginning since Columbus in 1492, and its elements continue with today's globalization trends.<sup>24</sup> Likewise, non-state actors seem to be an ever present element in global history with examples including privateers, religious organizations, and even some early global corporations like the East India Company.<sup>25</sup> The second aspect of Westphalia and its basis for the beginning of international law establishes in spirit if not in fact the precedent for the resolving of disputes peacefully for the good of the international community to prosper. This goes to another of the core arguments against the continuing validity of Westphalia in that there has been constant meddling in internal affairs of the state, nullifying the state sovereignty principle of Westphalia. Proponents of Westphalia like Dr. Gross would counter that

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<sup>23</sup> Michael Doyle, *Empires*, (Cornell University, New York, 1986), 87.

<sup>24</sup> Friedman, *The World is Flat*, 9.

<sup>25</sup> Doyle, *Empires*, 173.

with globalization comes compromise and conditions requiring agencies like the UN or IMF to address common disputes of states on the world stage.<sup>26</sup> This is not seen as interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign state, but rather acting in the spirit of equality that the Peace of Westphalia was founded upon and preventing the spread war.

Again, the growing access to deadly weapons make the non-state actor a serious security concern, but not a new one for the nation-state. Terrorism is a technique for influencing populations that is as old as the Bible itself. As the FLN terrorists noted in their campaign against the French in Algeria, they would blow-up bridges, conduct ambushes, and smuggle arms often for sole effect it would have on the populace, police and military.<sup>27</sup> All these actions were done both to influence and control the various social elements inside of the then French ruled Algeria. Nation-states maintain their sovereignty by maintaining the loyalty of the populace they serve; not without influence, but without question in their ability to affect the condition of that same populace. These conditions make the Westphalia nation-state model, when seen in the appropriate context as relevant as it was in 1648.

## **ALTERNATE WORLD HISTORY**

The genesis for this monograph centers around three very inter-related concepts in the realm of international relations and military strategy formulation, Globalization, Non-State Actors, and the rebirth of Counter Insurgency (COIN) Warfare in the United States.

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<sup>26</sup> Gross, *The Peace of Westphalia*, 1648-1948, 25-26.

<sup>27</sup> David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare; Theory and Practice*, (Praeger Publishers, New York, 1964), 11-13.

Globalization or world “connectedness” is seen by many has the panacea for the end of major global conflict and conventional confrontations; theorists like Barnett, Friedman and Huntington argue that this is a new condition that requires fundamental changes to both political and military thought.<sup>28</sup> The rise to power and influence of the non-state actor is said to herald the death or at least the serious change to the nation-state and the Westphalia State system since it was essentially established in 1648, as states lose both internal and external sovereignty to various cross border and international organizations that blur traditional boundaries of state power. And, the United States and its ability to decisively win the conventional phase of combat in both Iraq and Afghanistan and with its continued frustration in being unable to win the peace has brought many to include the media, policy makers, and others inside and out of the military the idea that a conventionally focused military force is obsolete. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s belief in this position had a definite impact on shaping the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) putting less emphasis on waging conventional warfare and more on combating terrorists and insurgents.<sup>29</sup> The U.S. must structure and resource its forces to conduct primarily COIN and security operations. Some alternate world theorists see that together, globalization and the non-state actor change the dynamics of international relations, increasing the irrelevancy of the Westphalia model in which nations make decisions. As a result, nations are less likely to engage in large scale conventional warfare; instead

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<sup>28</sup> Barnett, *The Pentagon’s New Map*, 9; Friedman, *The World is Flat*, 59; Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, 28-29.



nations will be more willing to conduct security operations and conduct COIN operations as that is the most common type of warfare a nation will encounter, if globalization theory is proved to be true.

Although all three elements described above have a definitive impact on the world today, it is a mistake to believe that their combined effects will be the demise of the power of the sovereign state and its ability to project its will on the world stage. Theories abound for how this will occur and below follows a discussion that explores alternative world views of how the future will potentially change given globalization, non-state actors, and the rebirth of COIN in military doctrine. Thomas Barnett, Samuel Huntington, and others to be discussed saw the collapse of the Soviet Union as a pivotal “date” in world politics that offered a unique opportunity to change the landscape of the world for the good of all man-kind. However, all see the nation-state as becoming less important to some other element of international decision making, all however differ widely in what that element will be.

### **Thomas Barnett and The Pentagon’s New Map**

Recently, one of the most popular future forecasters of world military and political evolution has been Dr. Thomas Barnett. In his book, *The Pentagon’s New Map*, Dr. Barnett lays out a very convincing argument for how world politics will change with continued globalization of world politics, economies, and even militaries. Like many

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<sup>29</sup> Bradley Graham, *Pentagon Prepares to Rethink Focus on Conventional Warfare*, Washington Post, January 26, 2005. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A36459-2005Jan25.html>(accessed on 28 February 2008).

future theorists, he lays out how the demise of the Soviet Union was a significant event whose significance was not fully realized until the potential to exploit this event had already passed.<sup>30</sup> He argues that the US Department of Defense was not quick enough to change the makeup of its military given new post Cold War realities. As a result, September 11<sup>th</sup> was the first shock wave which revealed the growing gap in the obsolete Cold War strategies of the US and the required new world order strategy required to succeed given what Barnett calls the “new rule sets” for the 21<sup>st</sup> century.<sup>31</sup>

Thomas Barnett is famous for witty presentations that engage the audience with straightforward analysis of future trends that can easily be understood and well support his hypothesis for future military forces. The crux of his thesis is that the world is essentially going to be divided into two very distinguishable categories; the Functioning Core, those countries that encourage and seek globalization or “connectedness” and the Non-integrating Gap, those countries that actively pursue isolation and resist globalization<sup>32</sup>. He further articulates that Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom mark the high-water mark for the US’s current administration for strategy in combating terrorism.<sup>33</sup> He argues that a more long term and efficient strategy is to protect the Core, project forces into seam states, and isolate in order to shrink the Non-Integrating Gap. Dr. Barnett even goes farther by suggesting a fairly radical change to

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<sup>30</sup> Barnett, *The Pentagon’s New Map*, 2.

<sup>31</sup> Barnett, *The Pentagon’s New Map*, 9.

<sup>32</sup> Barnett, *The Pentagon’s New Map*, 25-26.

<sup>33</sup> Barnett, *The Pentagon’s New Map*, 319-27.

the existing force structure of the military; leaving an existing Leviathan Force that would be used to smash and destroy conventional opponents, and a System Administration Force that would take over after the Leviathan Force leaves to stabilize and rebuild the country.<sup>34</sup>

The central question in Dr. Barnett's theory is how much other Functioning Core or strong Gap countries will be willing to buy-in completely to the new rule sets of globalization. Will China, Russia, or India accept globalization as a connected Core country, or as Monolithic Democracy part of the ever increasing American Imperialism that threatens their way of life? Certainly globalization is a good thing politically, economically and militarily; but the UN, EU, or NATO will never supplant the rule of the state in decision making or what lenses it sees the rest of the world through. And in this, globalization in the 21<sup>st</sup> century with the internet and satellite communications is a matter of velocity in comparison to how the Trireme was seen in Rome's heyday with its ability to connect and power project in world. It would be a huge security mistake for a state to hedge its national security on being connected and not prepared for future global confrontations, on any number of things like access to natural resources, access to ports, or ancestral claims. Dr. Barnett is correct in assessing that globalization is good, disconnectedness is bad, and that the US should defiantly have a System Administration Force ready to country build and provide stability. But, he goes too far in predicting that globalization will be the death of state sovereignty and conventional warfare; history unfortunately proves him wrong. Again Rome is perhaps a good case study to quickly

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<sup>34</sup> Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map*, 161.

demonstrate this point. As previously noted, Rome had a connected, “global” economy and much like the US today, had to combat not only organized monarchies to its East, but also barbarian elements to its North, which defiantly equated to violent, non-state actors during Rome’s time.<sup>35</sup> Despite political and economic globalization and continuous non-state actor threats, Rome was able to maintain its sovereignty for over 500 years.

### **Samuel Huntington and the Clash of Civilizations**

Another popular future theorist who also provides more of an adaption of the Westphalia model is Dr. Samuel Huntington and his book, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. Dr. Huntington also saw the collapse of the Soviet Union as a significant world event that would have the potential to shape future politics for the foreseeable future, but unlike many like Dr. Barnett, did not feel it would usher in a period of peace and tranquility. Instead, with the destruction of the US verse USSR paradigm, it would lead to a hybrid model of six to seven “civilizations” that would be in conflict in the world arena.<sup>36</sup> Huntington predicts a rather brutish world were cultures will be in conflict in a culturally centered, us verse them type of environment where cultural identity and survival becomes paramount to decision and policy making. He clearly does not go as far as Barnett, saying that the nation-state will still be important,

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<sup>35</sup> Doyle, *Empires*, 89-90.

<sup>36</sup> Huntington, *The Clash of Cultures and the Remaking of World Order*, 36-39.

but its views and policies will be clearly shaped by a cultural lens that will only become more focused as other cultures begin to act against the US's self interest.<sup>37</sup>

Dr. Huntington seems to have struck a relevant cord with his theory with events like September 11<sup>th</sup> bearing out his cultural clash perspective on first glance, until a deeper understanding of issues is realized. Where Dr. Huntington falls short is not giving enough credence for the potential of ideologies to cross and influence culture lines. Religious ideologues like Christianity or Islam would seem to have the ability to spread across cultural lines and influence diverse swaths of populations. In the past, democracy, communism, and socialism did the same. America, although founded on Judeo-Christian beliefs, allowed a mix of culture elements to immigrate and flourish inside the American fabric, potentially standing in the way of much of what Dr. Huntington also predicts for future clashes of civilizations. It is not clear what kind of strategy he would recommend to an administration or a military based on a cultural perspective or orientation. Although many academics will be quick to point the failures of many of the ideologies above, pointing perhaps the failure of pan-Arabism; but America and the success of its and other nations' spirit of nationalism despite many different ethnic and cultural divisions seemingly undermines Huntington's argument.

## **The Cold War and the End of An Era**

The end of the Cold War, like so many other times in history, seemed to mark an end to a dark chapter in human history that could soon be followed by a peaceful

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<sup>37</sup> Huntington, *The Clash of Cultures and the Remaking of World Order*, 21.

coexistence where war had been shown to be folly and abandoned completely by all. Francis Fukuyama in his article in the 1989 *The National Interest*, would predict an end of history; meaning that war and conflict were at an end, and liberal democracy would instill world order and peace. This again unfortunately is not the first time a significant event would bring hope for the end to global warfare. English scientist Joseph Priestly predicted something similar in 1792 with the signing of the English and French Treaty, Thomas Paine also at the end of French Revolution, and lastly John Stewart Mills believed it at the turn of the century with growing international commerce.<sup>38</sup> And again, like other times in history it has shown to be false. This is not to be a pessimist about the future state of man, it is just a reality check proving an old Roman axiom that has held true; “that if a nation truly wants peace, it should prepare for war.”

### **John Mearsheimer and the Tragedy of Great Power Politics**

What is the point of all this analysis and refuting of future world models? What do these future world model theorists miss? They miss what has not changed significantly in the world; and that is that nation-states will do and act in their own best interest to ensure their survival. Dr. John Mearsheimer states it best in his book *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* when he says; “Each state tends to see itself as vulnerable and alone, and therefore it aims to provide for its own survival. In international politics, God helps those who help themselves.”<sup>39</sup> Nations will participate

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<sup>38</sup> Donald Kagan, *On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace*, (New York, Doubleday 1995), 1-2.

<sup>39</sup> John Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, (New York, Norton, 2003), 34.

in globalism because it is usually beneficial to their economic self-interest; nations will support various ideologies (religious or political) if it is beneficial in unifying large population groups of their society. In the future world vision; economy is important of course, culture norms and values shape national perspective; but at the core, there will be an internal and externally recognized nation-state that shapes the policy for its own self-interests and objectives. To validate this, one has to look no farther than the history of US foreign policy to see that core policies have continually adapted and changed to meet it's growing power and changing world environment.<sup>40</sup> At the birth of the nation, President Washington was a strict unilateralist; believing strongly that any entanglement with foreign treaties or alliances would ultimately led to the US under the yolk of some imperial power, be it Britain, France, or other dominant European power; even if it meant watching the death of other democracy from the sidelines. This tradition has obviously changed drastically today as the US begins its policy of Global Meliorism where the US has taken on the mission of making the world a better place, often becoming "entangled" in treaties and alliances.<sup>41</sup> This is to stay; nations do not intentionally do evil just to achieve their ends (acting morally straight can be in a states interest as well), and most, if not all can be counted on to act in predictably acceptable ways. However, nation-states, despite all future models, globalization, or hope for a utopian like future will still act in what is seen as in their best interest. So far Communism, Islam, Christianity, and even America's celebrated Democracy have all failed so far to unify various nation-states

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<sup>40</sup> Walter A. McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State*, (New York, Houghton Mifflin, 1997), 10.

under a single banner. Mearsheimer, and history believe that it is more than probable this will continue to be true.

### **Westphalia Verse Old and New World Theorists**

What does the impact of these potential modifications or “rule-set” changes to principles of Westphalia imply for its continued validity into the 21<sup>st</sup> and beyond? As stated previously there are many theory purists who disagree with the notion of Westphalia and its influence today in international relations; some even calling it a myth in international relations. Barnett and company believe globalization and the rise of the non-state actor have changed the equation in which the Westphalia system is no longer relevant, meaning nation-states have lost the ability and necessity to maintain their sovereignty. Still others believe that Westphalia has never lived up to its core intent or achieved its goal of keeping the peace or preventing outside influence in state politics, sighting the long list of wars that have since occurred after 1648. The studied individuals who refute the achievements of Westphalia, like Stanford International Relations Professor Dr. Stephen D. Krasner who represents the main when he argued in an 1996 *International Security* article that the Westphalia principles of territorial autonomy have continually been violated with organizations like the EU and IMF influencing the internal policies of numerous supposedly independent nation states internal policies.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State*, 173.

<sup>42</sup> Stephen Krasner, *Compromising Westphalia*, *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 3. (Winter, 1995-1996) pp. 115-151.



Non-state actors dealt with in the past, Native Americans (granted that they were treated as individual “nations”) and Barbary Pirates were some of the first non-state actors that the new and fragile American government would have to contend with.<sup>43</sup> Today, international corporations can have profound influence across numerous borders with their ability to influence the economy of the numerous nations. A contemporary example being the French trader Jerome Kerviel who cost one of the central banks of France, the Societe Generale over 7.2 billion dollars that had to be recovered, but still did not threaten the sovereignty of the nation.<sup>44</sup> Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and even today’s simple, small arms make the threat of non-state actor actions and influence very real, but it is not a new threat. Powerful non-state actors have, and will continue to wax and wane in influence in the world and they are an important security concern; however they will not create the demise of the nation-state or the need for a conventionally focused army. How this concerns the employment and training of military forces is important and will be covered next; and in this essential connection it has to be clear that the continued relevancy and power of the Westphalia state system has a direct effect on that nation’s military force. The dynamics of this not being the case would certainly reverse the course of history to before the completion of the Peace of Westphalia and facilitate the rise again of mercenary armies. So far, this has not been the case.

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<sup>43</sup> McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State*, 26, 33.

<sup>44</sup> BusinessWeek, *Societe Generale*, (McGraw-Hill, February 25, 2008) 21.

## THE US MILITARY CONTEMPORARY OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

Terminology coming from the current US administration, military commanders, and even current joint doctrine has focus of the US military moving away from conventional operations and focusing more on non-traditional engagements with terrorists and insurgent forces. The 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (QDR) signed by then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld lists in the introduction a series of these shifts in the stance of US conventional forces that include focusing on conflict with non-state entities and fighting in nations that the US is not at war with (i.e. “safe-havens”).<sup>45</sup> Even more startling are the articles that appear in popular, mass-media news outlets debating the retention of the current conventional weapon systems and doctrine that has given the US its conventional supremacy over the last two to three decades. An article from the CNN on-line news web-site is typical questioning why the Air Force bothers to practice air-to-air combat or chooses to fund the advanced F-22 Raptor when the US currently enjoys unchallenged air supremacy.<sup>46</sup> Even more troubling were the ideas generated during the initial Army transformation movement in 2001 to 2003, prior to combat in Afghanistan and Iraq that the heavy main battle tank could be removed from the US Army inventory as it seemed unlikely that another armor-on-armor battle would

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<sup>45</sup> U.S. Department of Defense. *Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR) 2006*, (Washington, DC: 6 February 2006), v-vi, on-line at <http://www.comw.org/qdr/qdr2006.pdf> (accessed 29 February 2008).

<sup>46</sup> Pierre Sprey, James Stevenson, and Winslow Wheeler, *The Wrong Price for the Wrong Airplane for the Wrong War*, (Fort Worth Star-Telegram, 27 January 2008) online at [http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?documentid=4191&programID=37&from\\_page=../friendlyversion/printversion.cfm](http://www.cdi.org/program/document.cfm?documentid=4191&programID=37&from_page=../friendlyversion/printversion.cfm) (accessed 27 February 2008).

occur in the future.<sup>47</sup> This line of reasoning would question the need for a large heavy brigade combat team that utilizes the “legacy” platforms like the M-1A1 Abrams Main Battle Tank (MBT) or the M-3A2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV), potentially leaving the US military unable to meet near peer adversaries on equal footing. The question that is generated by all this speculation and analysis is what is the right mix of forces and platforms that the military as a whole should adopt to meet current and future challenges?

### **Building for the Future**

A sovereign nation that meets the three characteristics described by Dr. Holsti trains and equips a military force that they need and can afford based on their individual situation to ensure their security and survival. For a nation’s army this is considered their most sacred duty; Field Manual 3-0 *Operations* describes it as the Armies “non-negotiable contract” with the American people.<sup>48</sup> This process is both historical, looking back at trends that have occurred in a nation’s history; and also forward projecting looking at the capabilities of likely peer competitors. Currently, the US military is decisively engaged in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan primarily combating both insurgents and terrorists that have the ability to operate inside those countries with relative anonymity. Because the nation and it’s Army is decisively engaged, it’s vision and ability to shape future military capability is shortened greatly from what would be

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<sup>47</sup> Austin Bay, *Armor Amour—Suddenly the Beltway Loves Tanks*, (On-Point, 11 May 2005) online at [http://www.strategy.com/on\\_point/2005511.aspx](http://www.strategy.com/on_point/2005511.aspx) (accessed 26 February 2008).

considered it's normal capability, or as stated in the 2008 Army Posture Statement it is out of balance from what would be considered acceptable.<sup>49</sup> The vast majority of the current US military trains and equips to fight and win in what is currently the main effort in US foreign policy, being predominately counter-insurgency operations. This means that forces operating in these countries are conducting or directly supporting counter insurgency (COIN) operations to enable stability in both Iraq and Afghanistan so legitimate, functioning governments may be established. Given this current operating environment, the Army is supplying troops at an unsustainable level and to the detriment of conventional Mission Essential Task List (METL) training that would be required for traditional lethal operations.<sup>50</sup> The question is, can a conventional infantry or armor company; the level that has the most impact in a COIN type environment, perform equally well at conventional and stability operations, with COIN being considered a part of stability operations? The answer is yes. Operations in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo as well as the apparent relative success currently (February 2008) "post-surge" in Iraq and Afghanistan is proof of the answer. The caveat to this answer is that although the same unit may have the same ability to do both; they cannot do both well at the same time. To many of the tactical level units and commanders on the ground, again looking at the company level, there are many skills that have to be employed in both methods of

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<sup>48</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 14 June 2001), 1-2.

<sup>49</sup> U.S. Congress. Senate and House. 2008 Army Posture Statement to 26 February 2008. 110<sup>th</sup> Cong., 2d sess., 2008, 6-7, online at <http://www.army.mil/aps/08/> (accessed 2 March 2008).

<sup>50</sup> U.S. Congress. Senate and House. 2008 Army Posture Statement, ii.

warfare (Conventional and COIN); an example would be engaging targets with individual weapon systems of which soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan get plenty of exposure and training both in practice and unfortunately in operating in those environments. However, there are many essential METL elements that are not trained to what would be considered appropriate to win high-intensity conventional operations; examples being utilizing indirect fire to maneuver against a defending enemy, or commanding and controlling a conventional force while maneuvering on the battlefield. This condition is necessary because 1) the military has to adapt to the enemy it is currently fighting, something that has been done continually in the modern age and 2) the current US National Command Authority has assumed risk that any conventional threat that might arise can be decisively dealt with using the current technologically superior US Air Force and Navy.<sup>51</sup> The military and its leaders and soldiers understand the necessity of Department of Defense Policy 3000.05 “*Stability Operations are a core military mission that the Department of Defense must be prepared to and conduct.*”<sup>52</sup> Experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan show that it is a necessity that the military plan and train for these operations to “win the peace” following the usually shorter and easier conventional phase. The concern for the Army as described in the 2008 Posture Statement is that the Army has shifted its center-mass capability away from its conventional prowess displayed during Operation Desert Storm and the opening campaign of Operation Iraqi Freedom. What may not be obvious

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<sup>51</sup> GEN Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force*, New York, (Random House, 2005), 3-4.

<sup>52</sup> U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 27 February 2008), vii.


to those who have not experienced it is there are many not only tactical differences but also soldier and leader mind-set differences in conducting the two different kinds of operations. In conventional operations, a unit does not typically operate from a Forward Operating Base (FOB); US forces encourage aggressive maneuver to rapidly destroy an enemy before they can react adequately to what is hitting them. The tank and infantry fighting vehicle are often the favored platform with their speed and ability to deliver crippling damage to a defending enemy. They avoid being stationary for long periods of time, and avoid contact with civil populations as this is both dangerous and slows movement when closing with and destroying an enemy force. Stability and COIN operations are slow and deliberate, with US forces immersed in the civil populace to win their support; they are configured for short day patrols and configure unit tactical standard operating procedures as such. The tank and infantry fighting vehicle are not preferred as they destroy a city's road network and often discourage interaction from the civil populace.

### **Center-Mass Capability**

This is not to say that the Full-Spectrum Operations (replacing the AirLand Battle doctrine of the 1990's and into 2003) is flawed; on the contrary, military experiences since the end of the Cold War have validated its principles. The blending of offensive and defensive operations while incorporating a new focus on stability operations as stated in DODD 3000.05 is a realistic appraisal of the needs of army unit in dealing with likely

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threats in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The problem and tension is that a unit will have a center-mass ability given the training and manning it has received prior to entering an area of operations.



**Figure 1, Center-Mass Capability Diagram.**<sup>53</sup>

Leaving an offensively orientated force in Iraq probably led to a lot of the difficulty in smoothly transitioning to Phase Four stability operations. Like-wise, it is fairly intuitive that today's military operating in Iraq would have difficulty in quickly transitioning to defending the Fulda Gap against a huge conventional attack by the former Soviet Union. As noted above, there are clearly common tasks that transcend across the operational environment, but placed in an environment outside a unit's "Center-Mass Ability" and an all-volunteer military will be needlessly wasted until it is retrained for the new operating environment. This tension in the organization is intensified by three unique characteristics of a national military force. The first is that the Army is tasked with winning the nation's wars, leading to the second characteristic in that the

consequences for failure in a conventional confrontation is usually very high for a nation, potentially its very survival. The third is that recognizing a short-coming is like turning a big ship, it isn't quick and a nation can quickly find itself behind peer competitors if is not fully aware of global trends and movements; with an innovative military capable of turning and adapting quicker than those that are not.<sup>54</sup> As seen below, with total military capability of the US is slowly adapting to the requirement for increased stability operations, but off-set by off convention skill sets, destruction and damage of key weapon systems and the delaying or canceling of new weapon systems, it is easy to see how potential peer competitors will gain parity if not superiority over conventional US forces in the foreseeable future.<sup>55</sup>


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<sup>53</sup> Source: Derived from U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 27 February 2008), 3-1.

<sup>54</sup> Williamson Murray and Allen Millet, *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*, (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1996) 3-4.

<sup>55</sup> U.S. Congress. Senate and House. 2008 Army Posture Statement t, 9-11.





**Figure 2: Military Trend Line<sup>56</sup>**

The question of the connection between the future of US force structure and the Westphalia Model is in relation to current and projected threats. Given the validity of the Westphalia system on future world politics; the premise that nations remain sovereign to themselves, entering and exiting treaties and strategies as necessary in accordance with their own self-interest, it is extremely likely that a conventional war is not likely in the next five to ten years, but surely sooner than most policy makers think. Given this, with the current focus on COIN and the cost of sustaining the force in Iraq, will the US be ready to successfully wage a conventional war against a near competitor? Not the subject

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<sup>56</sup> Military trend line developed by the author as a mental framework for changing the structure and doctrine of a military force; taking time to react by retraining new soldiers and fielding new equipment, after being degraded by five years of deployment and conflict.

of this paper is the rightness or justification of the US in going to war in Iraq and Afghanistan, but what is the subject is the cost and policy of sustaining a US force capable of defeating future threats. A focus on COIN Operations is not the nail in the coffin for the current US military; on the contrary what has shown to be historically true is that the US military has to be capable of acting across the spectrum of war decisively and often simultaneously. But Westphalia shows us is that with globalization, growing peer competitors, and competition for economic partners, a solid conventional force will also be required to ensure the access of America to world markets that are key in sustaining many of the world's connected economies.

## **RECOMMENDATION**

What is the implication of all this apparent pessimism of the future ability of mankind to peaceably coexist? Specifically for the US and its national security strategy it does not mean it should forget all the hard-learned COIN doctrine that is coming into place in current Army doctrine. As was brought out earlier in this analysis, America has to win the current war. But this does not absolve the administration or the military of preparing for the future. However, statements proclaiming the conventional superiority of the US with the assumption that its ability would preclude any conventional challenger are both dangerous and short-sighted, especially given the current erosion of traditional conventional experiences. Examples in the past of this mistake include the opening months of the Korean conflict with Task Force Smith, the wholly undermanned and tragically underequipped force that could do little to stop a North Korean onslaught and Israel's belief that Egypt could not overcome the technical and tactical ability of the IDF; only to be surprised and suffer grievous losses to Soviet supplied AT-3 Sagger anti-tank

missiles, and SA-2 surface to air missiles.<sup>57</sup> Current ongoing operations have left the United States with a small strategic reserve and with an army that is currently (using terms from figure one) a stability focused army.<sup>58</sup> The issue with this situation is the ability of the Army to perform its primary mission which is to fight and win this nation's wars. As GEN Douglas MacArthur so eloquently put it in his farewell address to the 1962 West Point Class; "*Yours is the profession of arms, the will to win, the sure knowledge that in war there is no substitute for victory, that if you lose, the Nation will be destroyed, that the very obsession of your public service must be Duty, Honor, Country.*"<sup>59</sup> This is the heart of the issue; the military is and has to adapt to defeat the current foe in 2008 which is often a motivated, super-empowered non-state actor. But failure to be ready to fight the next war, potentially a decisive, conventional battle defending the interests if not the borders of the nation will have consequences beyond the scope of fighting terrorists or insurgents in small, "gap" areas of the world.

Nation-states have not gone away, nor will conflicts of interest between them. Globalization continues to connect economies and enhance mutual prosperity, but it does not replace core security concerns of a nation or replace the nationalistic fervor of a people. Although the specter of a global, nuclear war is perhaps diminished; Russia's

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<sup>57</sup> Avraham Adan, GEN (ret.), *On the Banks of the Suez*, (Jerusalem, Presidio Press, 1979), 79-87; Clay Bair, *The Forgotten War, America in Korea 1950-1953*, (New York, Doubleday, 1987)98-100.

<sup>58</sup> U.S. Congress. Senate and House. 2008 Army Posture Statement t, 6-7.

<sup>59</sup> Douglas MacArthur, GEN (ret.), (remarks to West Point Class upon accepting the Thayer Award 12 May 1962), on-line at <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/au-24/au24-352mac.htm> (accessed 15 February 2008).

concern with the installment of an NATO missile shield inside their former realm of influence, China's growing need for energy and subsequent presence in Africa; the still as yet unresolved Indian-Pakistan conflict are all areas of concern where a well manned and equipped conventional force will give the US policy makers the latitude and capability desired to achieve their national objectives. Russia, China, and even Iran have showed the ability to produce weapon systems that appear to be challenges to the best the current US military has to offer. Clearly non-state actors have been and will continue to be a concern and something that often has to be dealt with; but should not be at the cost of US conventional capability. This will diminish not only the military options of the US, but all elements of national power.

The way ahead in twenty-first century warfare will mean leveraging counter-insurgency warfare into a conventionally ready force. Now is not the time to *hold* the current conventional/technological gap that the US enjoys, but *expand* it as far as possible to stay in front of all potential peer competitor capabilities. Although the international environment is unusually benign in terms of conventional, nation-state confrontations, as highlighted in Army Posture Statement the US should as quickly as possible reconstitute its former conventional capability.<sup>60</sup> This would have to be done by either expanding the size of the force, or reducing its present global footprint. This again is not to say that the US military should disregard the necessity for stability operations, or the conduct of counter-insurgency operations, but it should always retain the ability to conduct decisive, conventional operations. Policy makers have to understand that the ability, coupled with

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<sup>60</sup> U.S. Congress. Senate and House. 2008 Army Posture Statement t, 6.

the current size of the US military gives it the ability to conduct operations across the spectrum of warfare, but not with dual center-mass capabilities in conventional and stability operations. The army at its current size can absolutely do both, but not at the same time. During World War Two, a US M-4 Sherman had to close within 800 meters of the heavier armored, better equipped German Panzer IV or Panther tank, while they could destroy the Sherman vehicles at over 2000 meters.<sup>61</sup> Given the small size, and all-volunteer nature of America's current military force, this situation should absolutely not be tolerated from occurring in the future. The US has far too much technological superiority and industrial might to accept parity from peer competitors. The US, its army, and without question the soldiers and leaders that make up its force are without question worth the price of maintaining this force.

To summarize the recommendations given the continued existence of the Westphalia-system of nation-state's, military and political policy makers should: 1) Understand that globalization does not currently replace nationalism or other ideologies that potentially lead to conflict and the requisite security needs and concerns; 2) Non-state actors do not replace the necessity to have a conventionally focused military, and likewise having a conventionally superior military will not negate the need to deal with non-state actors; and 3) The US military needs to regenerate its conventional capability by either growing the force or shrinking (or winning) its current global commitments. This balanced look into the future is the best way to ensure that the US retains the military to best meet the always unforeseen needs of future combatants.

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<sup>61</sup> Kenneth Macksey, *Tank versus Tank*, (London, Grub Street, 1999), 102.

## CONCLUSION

Many of the scholars referenced in this paper and current serving military leaders and soldiers will think this analysis looks like an aging dinosaur, out of touch with current operations and most likely potentialities for near-term conflict. But, for a successful military force that did not have to send a large portion of its soldiers home in metal coffins at the start of hostilities in Grenada, Panama, Desert Storm, Afghanistan, and Operation Iraqi Freedom the focus on conventional capability seems justified and appropriate. Given that this same force has the collective experience of stability operational success in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo, not to mention the current operational success in Iraq and Afghanistan, the flexibility of a conventionally trained and manned force appears to be beyond question. Although, the belief that it is best to be trained for lethal operations, and then execute nonlethal operations is too simplistic and does not capture the challenges of conducting stability operations, it does however capture the beliefs of many in the military. This summarizes the current tension that is felt in the military, the “out-balance” idea brought out in the Army’s Posture Statement. As an Army that tends to be disciples of Clausewitz and his often quoted principle that war is a “continuation of policy by other means”, it understands that it cannot always pick the battles that the nation requires it to fight.<sup>62</sup> But it also has the duty to prepare for future

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<sup>62</sup> Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret.(Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1976), 81.

wars and a duty to care for sons and daughters of America that voluntarily serve in its ranks.

Globalization, both wanted and necessary for a prosperous world order, will not unfortunately replace nationalism, or the end of war. Westphalia, the principle of state sovereignty is as strong as it ever was, even with an ever-more connected world. A non-state actor's ability to influence the population is not new, and will likely not change. What has changed is their access to growing levels of technology, means of manipulating the media, and weapons of mass destruction that give these actors an unprecedented ability to kill innocent citizens, but still does not give them the ability to replace the sovereignty of Westphalia state structure. So, globalization and non-state actors influence will continue, but so will the sovereignty of nation states, with nationalism and various other ideologies remaining a dominate value and belief system for the foreseeable future on the world stage; requiring the US military to always be ready to conduct decisive, conventional warfare.

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